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Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
A Global Health Challenge
In May 2013, World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Margaret Chan warned that a novel coronavirus, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV), posed “a threat to the entire world.”1 Her
warning was prescient. As of June 12, 2015, WHO had
been notified of 1289 individuals with laboratoryconfirmed infections in 25 countries, of whom at least
455 individuals (37%) had died.2 More than 85% of cases
have been diagnosed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Unlike the distantly related, more contagious, but
less fatal severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), MERS-CoV had not been publicly linked
to a “super-spreading” event (1 patient linked to ⱖ10 infections) until May 2015 in the Republic of Korea. When
the index case, a man aged 68 years from the Republic
of Korea, returned to Incheon International Airport (located 30 miles west of Seoul) on May 4, he was asymptomatic. He reportedly had traveled to Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Qatar,
but initially declared travel only to outbreak-free Bahrain. He became symptomatic on May 11 and sought care
in 2 outpatient clinics and 2 hospitals. He was eventually admitted to Pyeongtaek St Mary’s hospital, Gyeonggi
province, but MERS-CoV was unconfirmed until May 20,
reportedly initiating chains of transmission that increased to involve 126 cases with 11 deaths as of June 10.
The index patient was still hospitalized as of June 12.
China reported a MERS-CoV case on May 29, 2015—a
man aged 44 years from the Republic of Korea who flew to
Hong Kong on May 26, subsequently traveling to Huizhou,
Guangdongprovince,wherehewasplacedinisolation.Genetic sequencing showed no MERS-CoV mutations.

Origins, Epidemiology, and Clinical Features
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MERS is a viral respiratory illness novel to humans. First
reported in Jeddah, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in June
2012, the earliest outbreak occurred in March or April of
2012 in Zarqa, Jordan, with 9 laboratory-confirmed
cases. The outbreak was retrospectively linked to MERSCoV using frozen specimens.3,4
MERS is a zoonotic disease, with dromedary camels the likely animal reservoir. Transmission risk factors
include respiratory exposure to camel secretions, drinking raw camel milk, or eating undercooked camel meat.
Studies report increased risk in individuals with occupational contact with camels.5
MERS-CoVistransmissibleperson-to-person,butsustained community transmission has not been observed.
Like SARS-CoV, health care settings pose the highest risk.
Yet MERS-CoV is less contagious than SARS-CoV and has
higher fatality rates. Hospital-related outbreaks have occurred in multiple countries, including substantial nosocomial transmissions across the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

MERS typically presents as a nonspecific febrile respiratory tract infection, but can progress rapidly to respiratory failure, or it may never become severe. Thus
far, children have rarely contracted or died from MERSCoV. Risk factors for disease progression include comorbidity with lung disease, kidney disease, diabetes, and
immunodeficiency.

A Global Health Emergency?
The WHO director-general has convened 8 Emergency
Committee meetings on MERS under the International
Health Regulations, declining to declare a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Given the
ongoing outbreak, the director-general convened the
ninth meeting on June 16, with 2 major events in mind:
the month of Ramadan, which begins June 17 with a
surge in travelers and pilgrims performing the Umrah pilgrimage in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Hajj pilgrimage, the largest gathering in the world, which occurs September 20 through 25.
WHO was sharply criticized for delays in declaring
Ebola a PHEIC, but that should not provoke an overreaction to MERS-CoV. WHO should amend the International Health Regulations to grant the director-general
flexibility to designate graduated alert levels, from
heightened vigilance, rising to a PHEIC only when justified. On June 13, WHO and the Republic of Korea presented the results of a joint mission to understand the
virus and its transmission patterns.

Public Health Strategies
Public health measures—infection prevention and control, isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine—
historically have controlled MERS-CoV and were also
widely employed during SARS and Ebola outbreaks.
Transparency and Trust

Public fear and mistrust in government can impede epidemic response. The MERS-CoV outbreak in the Republic of Korea occurred in the aftermath of the Sewol ferry
disaster in April 2014, which resulted in the deaths of 304
students. The government of the Republic of Korea was
criticized for what some perceived to be an uncoordinated response and government obfuscation. In the case
of MERS-CoV, health authorities initially withheld the
names of hospitals handling cases. Transparency builds
public trust; given inevitable scientific uncertainty, health
authorities should fully disclose what is and is not known
about the MERS-CoV outbreak.
Community and Health Care Settings

MERS-CoV, like other coronaviruses, spreads through respiratory tract secretions, with hand hygiene recom(Reprinted) JAMA Published online June 17, 2015
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mended. The Republic of Korea has seen a surge in hand sanitizers,
as well as face masks.6 WHO recommends health worker precautions (eg, contact and droplet protective equipment), as well as airborne precautions for aerosol-generating procedures. Crowded hospitals and comingling of health workers, patients, and family
members likely contribute to transmission in health care settings.7
Early identification can prevent transmission and requires careful
travel histories for differential diagnosis. Health worker training on
infection prevention and control, as well as diagnostic testing of certain travelers, remains critical for an effective response.
Isolation and Quarantine

Isolation of patients with a known infection is recommended, but
optimal implementation of quarantine for exposed individuals is
more controversial (home-based, medical facility, or special housing). For example, the cordon sanitaire (a guarded line preventing
residents from leaving) to control Ebola provoked violence in Monrovia, Liberia. During the SARS outbreak of 2003, China and Singapore employed mass quarantines in apartment complexes or other
structures, monitored by armed guards or ankle bracelets. The Republic of Korea placed more than 3000 individuals exposed to
MERS-CoV in quarantine, mostly at home, but some in statedesignated facilities. Authorities were tracking cell phone signals to
monitor patient compliance. To gain public trust, quarantines should
be limited to well-documented exposures using the least restrictive means possible.

was “medically wrong,” too drastic a precaution given disruptions in
child education.6 WHO has urged the reopening of schools, and the
Republic of Korea has begun doing so. School closures may have a
role with novel influenzas, but are unproven for MERS-CoV given the
lack of community transmission.

Who Owns MERS-CoV?
In June 2012, a microbiologist in Jeddah sent blood samples from a
patient with unexplained pneumonia to Erasmus Medical Center, the
Netherlands, which identified a novel coronavirus later confirmed
as MERS-CoV. Erasmus then shared samples with multiple laboratories under material transfer agreements, contracts for transferring pathogens. Erasmus filed for patents on the use of the MERSCoV gene sequence. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia warned that the
microbiologist violated national rules and that Erasmus acted
unethically.8
Following Indonesia’s refusal to share influenza A(H5N1), WHO
adopted the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework in May
2011, governing virus sharing. This framework, however, fails to cover
noninfluenza pathogens. Impediments to virus sharing, restrictive
material transfer agreements, and patents can impede research on
novel pathogens. In May 2013, Dr Chan stated, “No [intellectual property] should stand in the way of you, the countries of the world, to
protect your people.”8 Yet there remain substantial holes in international rules needed to facilitate critical research.

Strengthening Health Systems
Travel Restrictions

The Republic of Korea restricted the travel of quarantined MERSCoV contacts following a security breach allowing a quarantined patient to fly to Hong Kong. The traveler denied MERS-CoV exposure,
even though he was febrile on arrival. He was then allowed to proceed by bus to Guangdong province where he tested positive for
MERS-CoV. Hong Kong issued a “red alert” advising against unnecessary travel to the Republic of Korea—a decision likely to be followed by other countries. This contravenes WHO guidance, which
finds travel restrictions ineffective due to lack of community transmission.
School Closures

More than 2400 kindergartens, schools, and universities were closed
in the Republic of Korea, despite Ministry of Health guidance that it
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A critical lesson from SARS, Ebola, and now MERS is that health settings can amplify transmission risks. Historically, health settings have
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